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CURRENT CASES
PER SE UNLAWFUL TYING ARRANGEMENTS UNDER
THE SHERMAN AND CLAYTON ANTITRUST ACTS: SUF-
FICIENT ECONOMIC POWER IN THE TYING PRODUCT
TO APPRECIABLY RESTRAIN COMPETITION IN THE
TIED PRODUCT MARKET FOUND TO EXIST. Digidyne
Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985).
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held a computer sys-
tems manufacturer's method of marketing its hardware and
software to be a per se illegal tying arrangement in violation of both
the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts. The circuit court found
the district court had erred in setting aside the jury's finding that
the defendant had unlawfully restrained competition in the market
for central processing units by use of a program license agreement
tying sales of its popular software program to its central processing
units. 1
The Data General case involves a complex, multi-district anti-
trust lawsuit. The defendant,2 Data General, designs, manufactures
and markets various computer systems including NOVA which con-
sists of a central processing unit ("CPU") bearing the NOVA trade-
mark, and a popular copyrighted operating system (software) called
"RDOS" containing basic operating commands specifically
designed for use with the NOVA CPU. As part of its marketing
stategy, Data General sold the RDOS software pursuant to a Pro-
gram License Agreement which precluded purchasers of RDOS
Copyright 0 1986 Jennifer Welsh Zeiter. All Rights Reserved.
1. The litigation focuses on three of Data General's marketing practices. For the sake
of brevity this casenote will focus primarily on the tying arrangement between the RDOS
operating software and NOVA central processing units. The tying arrangements between the
RDOS operating software and Data General's minimum hardware purchase requirements
and between Data General's CPUs and minimum memory equipment purchase requirements
are subject to similar antitrust analysis.
2. In seven of eleven consolidated actions, Data General is aligned as the sole defend-
ant. In the remaining four actions, Data General is nominally the plaintiff. Because all of the
antitrust claims place Data General in a defensive posture, Data General will be referred to
herein as the defendant, and all of the non-Data General parties will be referred to collec-
tively as the plaintiffs. See In re Data General Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 490 F. Supp. 1089,
1097, n. 3 (N.D. Cal. 1980) and In re Data General Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 529 F. Supp.
801, 804, n. I (N.D. Cal. 1981).
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software from using the program with any CPU not designated by
Data General. With two exceptions not relevant here, Data Gen-
eral designated only its own NOVA CPUs for use with its licensed
RDOS software. In effect, this required purchasers of Data Gen-
eral's RDOS software to also purchase Data General CPUs. Data
General further required its CPU purchasers and software licensees
to purchase a minimum equipment configuration of memory de-
vices and peripheral products, or to pay a substantial license charge.
Legal action against Data General based upon its marketing
methods commenced in June, 1978,3 when Digidyne Corporation
("Digidyne") amended its complaint to allege that Data General's
refusal to license RDOS operating software except to purchasers of
NOVA CPUs constituted an unlawful tying arrangement in viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act4 and section 3 of the Clayton
Act.5 Six more actions were subseqently filed against Data General
by other computer companies alleging similar antitrust violations
and in four trade secret actions initially filed by Data General, four
antitrust counter-claims were fled.6
In all, eleven antitrust actions were ified challenging the mar-
keting methods of Data General. These actions were consolidated
in the Northern District of California for pretrial proceedings.7 The
antitrust issue was bifurcated by segregating the issues of liability
and damages for trial.'
The plaintiffs9 manufacture and market CPUs in competition
with Data General. Plaintiffs' CPUs are "NOVA emulators"
designed to be functionally compatible with the RDOS software
marketed by Data General. Plaintiffs' marketing strategy offered
3. Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., No. C-78-1261 (N.D. Cal., filed June 1978).
4. Section I of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), states in pertinent part: "Every
contract, combination. . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce. . . is declared
to be illegal ....
5. Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1982), states in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods. . . for use,
consumption or resale. . . on the condition, agreement or understanding that
the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in goods. . . of a compet-
itor. . . where the effect of such lease, sale or contract for sale or such condi-
tion, agreement or understanding may be to substantially lessen
competition. ...
6. See In re Data General, 529 F. Supp. 801, 804, n. 1, for a list of the cases involved.
7. 529 F. Supp. at 804, n.l. Of the eleven actions filed, only two, Fairchild Camera &
Instrument Corp. v. Data General Corp., No. C-78-2418 (N.D. Cal., filed Oct. 1978) and
Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., No. C-78-1261 (N.D. Cal., filed June 1978) actually
proceeded to trial. The remaining actions were settled prior to commencement of trial.
8. 490 F. Supp. at 1099.
9. See supra note 2.
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consumers the option of assembling a multi-brand computer system
composed of plaintiffs' "NOVA emulator" CPUs and Data Gen-
eral's RDOS software. 10
Following extensive discovery," cross-motions for summary
judgment were filed. Plaintiffs contended Data General's tying ar-
rangement possessed the required elements of a per se antitrust ty-
ing violation. Data General contended it lacked the requisite
economic power in the tying product (RDOS operating software)
market to appreciably restrain competition in the tied product
(NOVA CPU) market.12
Considering the cross-motions, the district court first defined a
tying arrangement as "an agreement by a party to sell one product
but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different
(or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that
product from any other supplier." 3 The court then identified the
three elements necessary to establish a per se illegal tying
arrangement:
First, there must be two separate products, with purchase of one
(the "tying product") conditioned upon the purchase of the other
(the "tied product"). Second, the seller must possess sufficient
economic power in the tying product market appreciably to re-
strain competition in the tied product market. Third, a not in-
substantial amount of commerce in the tied product must be
affected. 14
In addition to these three elements, plaintiffs were also re-
quired to prove actual damages causally linked to Data General's
antitrust violation."
Ruling on the summary judgment motions, the district court
found in favor of plaintiffs on all issues except the second element of
economic power. The court found there was no dispute of material
10. 490 F. Supp. at 1098.
11. ,Discovery encompassed the production of over 600,000 documents, the taking of
nearly 150 depositions and the exchange of hundreds of interrogatories and requests for ad-
missions. 490 F. Supp. at 1097.
12. 490 F. Supp. at 1098.
13. 490 F. Supp. at 1100.
14. Id., citing as support Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394
U.S. 495, 499 (1969) (hereinafter cited as "Fortner I").
15. Plaintiffs were successful in establishing damage and causation. The record con-
tained undisputed facts indicating customers had been deterred from purchasing plaintiffs'
NOVA emulator CPUs. This alone was sufficient to support a finding of damages. The
causation requirement was satisfied upon a mere showing that there existed a reasonable
probability that foregone CPU sales were a result of RDOS software purchasers feeling
bound by the tie-in to use Data General's CPUs rather than plaintiffs'. 490 F. Supp. at 1118-
19.
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fact as to the existence of the first element.16 Evidence of separate
availability, separate pricing, and separate manufacturing and mar-
keting of CPUs and software by both Data General and other com-
puter companies served to establish that RDOS operating software
and NOVA CPUs were separate and distinct products, notwith-
standing the fact neither could function without the other.17 These
findings, together with Data General's Program License Agreement
which restricted the RDOS software to use with NOVA CPUs, fully
satisfied the first requisite element of an unlawful tie-in. 8 Similar
considerations supported the court's conclusion that Data General's
memory devices and CPUs were separate products required to be
purchased pursuant to a tying scheme.' 9
The district court also found no dispute of material fact as to
the existence of the third element. The court stated that in deter-
mining whether the effect of a tying arrangement on interstate com-
merce is not insubstantial, the relevant inquiry is whether the total
volume of sales of the product tied by the sales policy under chal-
lenge is more than "de minimis."20 The court found the sale of
52,700 NOVA CPUs during an eight year span, with shipments in
one year alone valuing $245 million dollars, to be a non "de
minimis" amount of commerce affected by the tying arrangement. 2'
With respect to the CPU-memory tie-in, Data General's admission
of substantial sales coupled with the admission that all CPUs sold
from its regular price list were packaged together with at least one
memory board constituted a sufficient amount of commerce affected
by the tie-in to satisfy the third requisite element.
However, the court found disputed issues of material fact with
respect to the second requisite element. In its analysis of the eco-
nomic power element, the court stated that although three alterna-
tive indicia of economic power have been recognized, the
appropriate economic power inquiry in the instant case was
whether the RDOS operating software (tying product) was suffi-
ciently unique to have some advantage not shared by its competi-
tors in the CPU (tied product) market.2"
16. In order to satisfy the first element of an unlawful tying arrangement, it must be
established that two separate products are being marketed and that both are required to be
purchased pursuant to a tying scheme. 490 F. Supp. at 1103.
17. 490 F. Supp. at 1103-04.
18. 490 F. Supp. at 1106-07.
19. 490 F. Supp. at 1107-11.
20. 490 F. Supp. at 1116-17.
21. Id.
22. 490 F. Supp. at 1111-12. The three alternative indicia of economic power that have
been recognized are as follows:
[Vol. 2
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Relying on United States v. Loew's, Inc.,2 3 plaintiffs claimed
that the copyrights concededly attached to the RDOS software cre-
ated legal barriers from which the requisite economic power could
be presumed. The district court rejected this claim noting that not
only was the presumption of economic power not conclusive, but
the sole fact of copyright notice was insufficient to establish the req-
uisite economic power.2 4 Plaintiffs alternatively argued that Data
General enjoyed economic advantage by having customers "locked-
in" to its computer software.25 Plaintiffs contended that because
customers spend millions of dollars designing applications software
tailored to a particular operating system, they become financially
committed to using only one software operating system, such as
Data General's RDOS. This "lock-in" of customers to RDOS oper-
ating software effectively insulated Data General from the market-
place to enable it to impose discriminatory prices or terms upon its
customers.26 Noting the competitiveness of Data General's prices,
the court rejected this argument and similar others relating to the
CPU-memory tie-in.
The court ultimately concluded that whether Data General
(1) A showing that the seller occupies a dominant position in the tying pro-
duct market;
(2) a showing that the seller's product is sufficiently unique that he has some
advantage not shared by his competitors in the market for the tying product;
and
(3) a showing that a substantial number of customers have accepted the tie-in
and there are no explanations other than the seller's economic power for their
willingness to do so.
23. 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962).
24. 490 F. Supp. at 1112.
25. 490 F. Supp. at 1114. The court of appeals explained the "lock-in" theory as
follows:
Briefly, defendant sells RDOS and NOVA CPUs primarily to original equip-
ment manufacturers (OEMs) who combine them with application software (a
set of instructions that allows the system to accomplish a particular task) to
create a complete computer system for resale. Application system software for
particular uses is developed by OEMs at substantial expense. . . . However,
application software is designed to function with only a particular operating
system. OEMs who construct their application software to function with de-
fendant's RDOS therefore must purchase an RDOS for each computer system
they assemble using that application software. Because of the tying condition,
they must also purchase one of defendant's NOVA instruction set CPUs for
each such computer system they sell.
An OEM can free itself from this "lock-in" only by abandoning its appli-
cation software compatible with defendant's RDOS, in which it has a substan-
tial investment, or converting the software so that it may be used with another
operating system.
734 F.2d at 1342.
26. 490 F. Supp. at 1114-16.
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possessed sufficient power in the tying product (RDOS software)
market to raise prices or to require purchasers to accept burden-
some terms that could not be exacted in a completely competitive
market was a disputed issue of material fact.1 7 Thus, summary
judgment on this issue was precluded.
Lastly, the court considered legitimate business justificiation as
an affirmative defense to the per se rule against tying arrangements.
Data General argued that restricting RDOS software to use with
NOVA CPUs was necessary to protect business good will and mini-
mize service problems. The use of foreign CPU's with Data Gen-
eral's software would cause the software to malfunction more
frequently and require greater field servicing which Data General
would be unable to economically provide, with the end result being
dissatisfied customers and the tarnishing of Data General's reputa-
tion. In rejecting this argument, the court first noted that legitimate
business justifications are few and narrowly construed, prevailing
only in the absence of less restrictive alternatives. Thus, even if
Data General's assertions were accepted as true, the restraint on
competition was not justifiable as less restrictive alternatives existed
such as providing lesser warranties on software licensed for use with
foreign CPUs.28
Alternatively, Data General argued it was required to bundle
together software and CPUs in order to recover its substantial in-
vestment in software research and development; therefore, to per-
mit manufacturers of NOVA emulators to reap the benefits of Data
General's research and development by selling competing CPUs for
use with Data General's software would be unfair. 29 The court re-
jected this argument stating recovery of investment costs were ex-
plicitly excluded from the narrowly construed business exceptions
to the per se rule against tie-ins.30
Other business justifications were asserted and similarly re-
jected by the court on the grounds that less restrictive alternatives
27. 490 F. Supp. at 1103.
28. 490 F. Supp. at 1121. The "good-will" defense is the most frequently raised defense
in tie-in cases. 490 F. Supp. at 1120. The only situation in which the protection of good will
may necessitate the use of tying clauses is where specifications for a substitute would be so
detailed they could not practically be supplied. Standard Oil Co. v. U.S., 337 U.S. 293, 306
(1949). The ninth circuit has also suggested in dictum that a good will justification might be
accepted where specifications could not be supplied because to do so would divulge trade
secrets. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F. 2d 43, 51 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 955 (1972).
29. 490 F. Supp. at 1121-22.




Thus, the sole issue of whether Data General possessed suffi-
cient economic power in the tying product market to appreciably
restrain competition in the tied product market proceeded to trial.
After a 45 day trial, the jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiffs.
Data General moved for judgment non obstante veredicto (judgment
n.o.v.) or, in the alternative, reconsideration of the court's grant of
partial summary judgment and for a new trial. Plaintiffs moved for
an injunction and for trial on the issue of damages. The court
granted Data General's motion for (judgment n.o.v.) or in the alter-
native for a new trial, and denied plaintiffs' motions.
In reconsidering the evidence on economic power, the court
focused on the definitions of the relevant markets for the tying and
tied products, and the degree of market analysis necessary to prove
economic power in a tying case. Data General argued that exten-
sive market analysis of such factors as suitability, cross-elasticity of
demand and potential competition was required.32 Plaintiffs argued
proof of relevant markets was unnecessary in per se tying cases
where economic power is predicated on uniqueness of the tying
product, and that economic power over an appreciable number of
buyers was all that was required.33 The court held that although
intricate market analysis and detailed evidence of certain factors
was not required in the context of per se tying cases, some degree of
market analysis was necessary.34
In reviewing the jury's findings on this issue, the district court
concluded that no reasonable jury could have found that Data Gen-
eral possessed sufficient economic power in the tying product mar-
ket to appreciably restrain competition in the tied product market
as those markets had been defined.3 5 Specifically, the court found
that the existence of "locked-in" customers did not insulate Data
General from competitive business restraints of the general market;
that Data General's prices were competitive; and that Data Gen-
31. 490 F. Supp. at 1122-23. The court rejected similar business justification defenses in
connection with the CPU-memory tie finding less restrictive alternatives available, such as
offering CPUs without main memory under a lesser warranty package than that accompany-
ing a CPU-memory package, or providing specifications that foreign memory boards would
be required to meet in order to be used with Data General's CPUs.
32. 529 F. Supp. at 807.
33. Id.
34. 529 F. Supp. at 808.
35. 529 F. Supp. at 814. The court did note, however, that the jury's definition of the
relevant tying and tied product markets was clearly supported by the evidence. 529 F. Supp.
at 812.
1986]
COMPUTER & IIGH-TECHNOLOGY L4W JOURNAL
eral's software line, although inherently superior, was not unique.3 6
Competitors were not prevented from developing functionally
equivalent software, despite the existence of economic or legal barri-
ers such as copyright, trade secret and trademark protection.
The court also found that plaintiff's failure to prove that Data
General possessed the requisite economic power in the relevant ty-
ing product market necessarily meant that Data General could not
exercise such power to restrain competition in the relevant tied
product market.37
Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of Data General's
motion for judgment n.o.v. or for a new trial.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
district court had properly granted summary judgment on the first
and third elements, adopting the district court's reasoning on those
issues.3 8 The court of appeals noted that the district court's sepa-
rate product determination was supported by the recent United
States Supreme Court case of Jefferson Parish Hospital District No.
2 v. Hyde39 in that a demand existed for NOVA CPUs separate from
the RDOS software, and each element of the NOVA computer sys-
tem could have been provided separately and selected separately by
customers if they had not been compelled by Data General to take
both.4°
The court of appeals also agreed with the district court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on the issues of whether
plaintiffs had been damaged by the tie-in and whether the tie-ins
were justified by legitimate business considerations. 41 However, the
court of appeal held the district court erred in setting aside the
jury's verdict for plaintiffs on the issue of economic power.42
Specifically, the court of appeals found the district court erred
in interpreting the "sufficient economic power" standard in the case
of US. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc.43 as requiring proof
that Data General had a monopoly or even a dominant position
throughout the market for the tying product. The court of appeals
explained that whereas possession of monopolistic power or market
dominance are sufficient to establish per se illegality, they are not
36. 529 F. Supp. at 814-18.
37. 529 F. Supp. at 818.
38. 734 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985).
39. 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1561-65 (1984).
40. 734 F.2d at 1339.
41. 734 F.2d at 1339, n. 1.
42. 734 F.2d at 1339-40.
43. 429 U.S. 610 (1977) (hereinafter cited as "Fortner II").
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required.' What is required in a per se case is a type of market
power referred to as "leverage," which the court in Jefferson Parish
Hospital defined as a supplier's ability to induce customers for one
product to buy a second product they normally would not buy.g5
Thus, the appropriate inquiry was not whether Data General had
power over the whole market for the tying product (RDOS
software), but whether Data General's RDOS was sufficiently
unique and desirable to an appreciable number of buyers to enable
Data General to force those buyers to also buy a substantial volume
of Data General's NOVA CPUs." This standard is well supported
by the cases cited in the court of appeals' opinion.47
In applying this standard to the instant case, the court of ap-
peals found a jury could have reasonably concluded that the stan-
dard had been met. The admitted superiority and consumer
popularity of RDOS in comparison with competing operating sys-
tems, and the fact that RDOS software could not be reproduced by
competitors without copyright infringement and utilization of trade
secrets, constituted abundant evidence that RDOS was particularly
desirable to a substantial number of buyers and could not be readily
produced by other sellers.48 Furthermore, the lock-in of Data Gen-
eral's customers to the use of RDOS together with the minimum
equipment configuration program provided additional support of
the existence of Data General's possession of economic power.
The court of appeals explicitly rejected the district court's sug-
gestion that the presumption of economic power from the existence
of a copyright is inappropriate in the context of computer software:
"The RDOS copyright established both the distinctiveness of
RDOS and a legal bar to its reproduction by competitors. 'The req-
uisite economic power is presumed when the tying product is pat-
ented or copyrighted.' The copyright confers upon defendant 'some
advantages not shared by his competitors in the market for the ty-
ing product.'" (citations omitted.)49
The court of appeals also found the district court erroneously
imposed the burden of proof on the issue of economic power on the
44. 734 F.2d at 1339-40.
45. 104 S. Ct. at 1558.
46. 734 F.2d at 1341.
47. See generally, United States v. Loew's, Inc. 371 U.S. 38, (1962); Fortner I, 394 U.S.
at 502-04; and Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 620.
48. 734 F.2d at 1341-42.
49. 734 F.2d at 1341. The premise of the district court's position was laid to rest in
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l., Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) and Apple Com-
puter, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249-54 (3rd Cir. 1983). 734 F.2d at
1344, n. 5.
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plaintiffs. The presumption of economic power created by the
RDOS copyright shifted the burden to Data General to rebut the
presumption.50
The court of appeals further found the district court's concern
with whether there were reasonably interchangeable substitutes for
RDOS in the operating systems market as a whole was misplaced.
Noting that this question was of critical importance in monopoly
cases, the court stated the concern with tying arrangements is not
with the restraint on competition in the tying product market (oper-
ating software), but the restraint on competition in the tied product
market (CPUs).51 The focus with respect to the tying product was
its uniqueness and desirability, not its market power. Thus, the cru-
cial inquiry was not whether other operating systems with which
RDOS competed were as good as or better than RDOS, but
whether RDOS, available only from Data General, was sufficiently
attractive to some customers to enable Data General to require
those who wished to obtain RDOS to also buy NOVA CPUs. 2 The
court of appeals found ample evidence of Data General's possession
of such power. The fact that Data General's NOVA CPUs were
competitively priced was irrelevant as Data General still could and
did force the tie-in upon some buyers who, if free to choose, would
have bought RDOS from Data General but "NOVA emulator"
CPUs from others. 3
Lastly, the court of appeals held that the district court erred in
analyzing competitive conditions in the tied product market and in
its conclusion that plaintiffs failed to prove an appreciable restraint
in the market for the tied product. The court of appeals reaffirmed
the rule that all that is required in per se cases is a showing that a
substantial volume (an amount greater than "de minimis") of com-
merce has been foreclosed, which the court found clearly satisfied in
this case. 4 Detailed analysis of competitive conditions in the tied
product market is inappropriate. 5
Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the district court's
decision to grant the judgment n.o.v. or, alternatively, a new trial.
The United States Supreme Court denied Data General's petition
for writ of certiorari on July 1, 1985,56 and on August 28, 1985 a
50. 734 F.2d at 1344.
51. 734 F.2d at 1345.
52. 734 F.2d at 1345-46.
53. 734 F.2d at 1346.
54. 734 F.2d at 1347.
55. 734 F.2d at 1347.
56. 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985).
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petition for rehearing was denied.57 Trial on the issue of damages is
still pending.
The court of appeals' holding in this case carries an important
warning to those in the computer industry. In the highly competi-
tive computer industry arena, a strong customer base and loyalty is
an essential ingredient of survival. Marketing techniques such as
tying arrangements which tend to assure the continued existence of
customers and sales are tempting. However, as Data General illus-
trates, courts will not hesitate to strike down such arrangements
and subject those who participate therein to substantial damages.
Tempted computer manufacturers and distributers should be
aware that consistent with the harsh treatment of tying arrange-
ments by antitrust law,58 proving a per se illegal tying arrangement
is not very difficult. For example, the "not an insubstantial effect on
commerce" element is satisfied by a showing that the volume is
merely not "de minimis." In United States v. Loew's, Inc. the
Supreme Court held the sum of $60,800 to be a non de minimis
amount,59 and in Fortner I the sum of almost $200,000 was not
looked upon as "paltry or insubstantial."6
It should also be noted that an illegal tying arrangement does
not necessarily require that one party or entity offer both the tying
product and the tied product. A violation may be found if the of-
feror of the tying product has an economic interest in the tied prod-
uct, even though the latter is manufactured or otherwise produced
by another party or entity.61 Thus, where the owner of the tying
product exerts its coercive power to restrict the trade of the tied
product sold by a third person in exchange for the extra benefit ex-
torted from the latter, such is sufficient to be a violation.62 Further-
more, with respect to the computer industry in particular, two
computer products may be illegally tied. This would occur when
the technological relationship between the two computer products
compels the dual purchase which ties the products, rather than to
achieve some technologically beneficial result.63
57. 106 S. Ct. 18 (1985).
58. 490 F. Supp. at 1099.
59. 371 U.S. 38, 49 (1962).
60. 394 U.S. at 501 (1969).
61. Suburban Mobile Homes v. Amtac Communities, 101 Cal. App. 3d 532, 547, 161
Cal. Rptr. 811, 819 (1980).
62. Id. at 548, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 820. See also Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 286 F.2d
832, 839-40 (4th Cir. 1960): "an amount which yields the defendant an extraneous recovery
is sufficient."
63. Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1330 (5th Cir.
1976).
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In addition, separate availability of the tying product will not
preclude antitrust liability where a pricing policy has been estab-
lished in such a way that the only viable economic option is to
purchase the tying and tied products in a single package. 64 Also, as
illustrated in Data General, even competitive pricing will not pro-
tect a seller from an otherwise unlawful tying arrangement.
Lastly, Data General reaffirms the rule that in determining
whether sufficient economic power exists in per se unlawful tying
arrangement cases, all that need be shown is that the tying product
is sufficiently unique and desirable to an appreciable number of buy-
ers to enable the seller to force buyers to purchase products they
otherwise would have preferred not to buy, or would have preferred
to buy elsewhere. This element is relatively simple to establish con-
sidering the fact that most computer products are either copy-
righted or patented, and sufficient economic power may be
presumed from copyright or patent of the tying product.
In conclusion, in developing a marketing strategy, marketing
managers, strategists and promoters should heed the warning of
Data General by carefully avoiding the tying of any two separate
products together in the hopes of guaranteeing future sales and
customers.
Jennifer Welsh Zeiter
64. See, e.g., Colorado Petroleum Marketers Ass'n v. Southland Corp., 476 F. Supp.
373, 376-77 (D. Colo. 1979).
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CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF TRADE SECRET THEFT
People v. Gobal, 171 Cal. App. 3d 524, 217 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1st Dist.
1985).
The California Court of Appeal for the 1st district has affirmed
a judgment against Peter K. Gopal, finding the defendant guilty of
trade secret theft under California Penal Code section 499c, and
receipt of stolen property under California Penal Code section 496.
The court held that an "article" 1, representing a trade secret also
includes a "copy" of such article, and anything which may be the
subject of theft can also be "property" under section 496. The court
further held that the receipt of a copy of stolen trade secrets is a
crime in violation of section 496. People v. Gopal2 represents the
first reported case dealing with Penal Code section 499c since Peo-
ple v. Serrata in 1976,1 and only the second reported decision to
date involving criminal prosecution for trade secret theft.
The Gopal case arose out of a "sting" operation relating to the
alleged theft of trade secrets from "Silicon Valley" firms manufac-
turing semiconductor devices and computer chips. The defendant
offered to sell and did deliver stolen property to undercover corpo-
rate security officers, resulting in his arrest.4 Thereafter, a warrant
was obtained to search the defendant's condominium and business
premises. With the assistance of several engineers and security of-
ficers from Intel Corporation and National Semiconductor Corpo-
ration, 5 police found large quantities of articles relating to the
manufacture of semiconductors. These articles of the computer
chip manufacturing process, such as data base tapes, reticles, and
overlays, can enable a competitor to bypass the substantial time and
expenses involved in circuit design, digitizing, and checking. Pos-
session of these components can save a manufacturer the costs in-
volved in reverse engineering an end product.6
1. 499c(a)(1)(4) states in part that an "article means any object, material, device, or
substance or copy thereof...." Section 499c was amended in 1983, yet this provision re-
mains. Unless otherwise indicated, references to section 499c are to the version in effect
during the alleged offenses.
2. 171 Cal. App. 3d 524, 217 Cal. Rptr. 487 (Ist Dist. 1985).
3. 62 Cal. App. 3d 9, 133 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1st Dist. 1985).
4. 171 Cal. App. 3d at 528, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
5. The validity of this search was upheld in People v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. App.
3d 1001, 163 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1st Dist. 1980).
6. "Reverse engineering" is an accepted and lawful practice in industry. It involves
starting with a known product and working backwards to discover the process by which it
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The prosecution based its case on the defendant's possession,
copying, and marketing of the articles relating to the manufacture
of semiconductors. The defendant acquired the articles and infor-
mation from National Semiconductor Corporation and Intel Corpo-
ration employees who were obligated not to disclose them.7 After a
thirty-one day court trial, Gopal was found guilty of conspiracy to
commit a crime, offering a bribe to acquire a trade secret, and four
counts of possession of stolen property.
On appeal, the court stated the legislature expressly declared
the purpose for enacting section 499c was to "clarify and restate
existing law with respect to crimes involving trade secrets and to
make clear that articles representing trade secrets, including trade
secrets represented thereby, constitute goods, chattels, materials,
and property, and can be the subject of criminal acts."8 With the
legislative intent in mind, the court interpreted the statute and held
that an "article" representing a trade secret includes a "copy" of
such article.9 The court focused on the content of the information
and not the form in which it is reproduced in determining that the
property possessed by the defendant embodied trade secrets belong-
ing to Intel Corporation.
In affirming the district court's findings as to the embodiment
of trade secrets within the stolen property, the court of appeals
noted the language of section 499c. It provides that, "a trade secret
shall be presumed to be secret when the owner thereof takes meas-
ures to prevent it from becoming available to persons other than
those selected by the owner to have access thereto." 10 The court of
appeals examined the evidentiary record of the district court and
found that detailed and elaborate security measures were taken by
the owners of the articles used to manufacture semiconductors. At
Intel Corporation, physical access to the plant was controlled
through the use of guards, employee identification badges, visitor
escorts, and special sign-in procedures. Security measures at Na-
tional Semiconductor Corporation were similar. The check-out of
proprietary items was controlled by requiring a manager's approval,
confidential materials were kept locked up, and documentary
materials were shredded when no longer needed. Employees at
was developed and manufactured. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476
(1974).
7. Proceedings against these defendants were severed from the case against Gopal. See
171 Cal. App. 3d at 529, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
8. 171 Cal. App. 3d at 541, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 499c(a)(1), (4).
10. CAL. PENAL CODE § 499c(a)(3).
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both corporations were required to sign nondisclosure agreements
when hired, upon termination, and periodically during the course of
their employment.l1
The court of appeals, in citing People v. Serrata, stated that
these measures compared favorably with security precautions taken
at IBM Corporation.12 In Serrata, security precautions were a cen-
tral issue as the defense alleged IBM Corporation had not taken
reasonable measures to protect the secrecy of its information.13 The
standard of care regarding security precautions in trade secret cases
continues to evolve as technology and security advances are utilized
by more businesses. Accordingly, the court found sufficient evi-
dence to indicate that Intel Corporation and National Semiconduc-
tor Corporation had taken sufficient measures to allow the
presumption of secrecy set forth in section 499c, to be applied.14
In addition to being a trade secret within the meaning of sec-
tion 499c, the information, design, process or procedure must also
be generally unavailable to the public, and it must give the owner an
advantage over competitors who do not know of or use the trade
secret.15 On the issue of general unavailability to the public, the
defense focused on the end product rather than the articles which
he possessed. Strictly applying the language of section 499c, the
court of appeals held that the statutory definition refers not only to
the end product, but also to "any portion or phase of any scientific
or technical information, design.... ."16 The "trade secret" at issue,
the court held, was not the end product, but it was embodied in the
various articles relating to the manufacture of the end product. The
design information contained in these articles was overwhelmingly
found to be not generally available to the public.17
Consequently, the court of appeals also found that the unavail-
ability of these products gave the owner an advantage over competi-
tors who did not know of or use them. 8 Even though an end
11. 171 Cal. App. 3d at 538, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
12. Id.
13. "IBM has taken numerous measures to protect its trade secrets, e.g., stamping all
secret drawings as, "IBM confidential," auditing the files of employees for the unauthorized
possession of documents, requiring countersignatures when documents were checked out, and
installing special magnetic locks on "high security" buildings . 62 Cal. App. 3d at 23,
133 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 499c(a)(3).
15. 171 Cal. App. 3d at 539, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 496 (in reference to section 499(c) subd.
(a)(3)).
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product was on the market and susceptable to reverse engineering,
having copies of the articles used to manufacture semiconductors
would substantially reduce the amount of time necessary to reverse
engineer. The court of appeals concluded that there was sufficient
evidence to support the district court's findings that the various arti-
cles, relating to the manufacture of semiconductors, were "the em-
bodiment of trade secrets."19
As a guide to future practice, People v. Gopal provides some
important points. The court of appeals rejected the defendant's
contention that receipt of stolen trade secrets is not a crime. Yet,
section 499c does not create a new crime so much as it defines a
particular species of theft. The utilization of criminal prosecutions
for trade secret theft may be the most valuable precedent of Gopal.
The unique nature of trade secret property need no longer inhibit
prosecutors from bringing criminal actions for theft or wrongful
misappropriation.
Kevin Gerry
19. Id.
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